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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the performance of newly hired coaches in relation to 
their predecessors, and utilize the analysis to provide guidance to decision makers in college 
athletic departments.  This study examined 185 coaching changes in Division I women’s 
basketball in 16 conferences between 2000 and 2009.  Data were collected from online sources 
including institutional websites, media guides, and media articles.  Latent class analysis was 
employed to reduce the data to one item per factor.  Factors included demographics, coaching 
ability, coaching experience, past team performance, hiring factors (coaching level change, 
inside/outside hire, interim, conference affiliation), and institutional factors (public/private, 
demographic market area, enrollment, budget, and NACDA standings).  Mixed models analysis 
was performed to identify which categories have a relationship with changes in the number of 
wins following a coaching change.  Results suggest that past team performance was the 
strongest indicator of future performance after a coaching change. 
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Who should we hire: Examining coaching succession in Division I women’s basketball 
Introduction 
Women’s basketball plays an important role in Division I college athletics in the United 
States.  With over 8.2 million people attending games, nearly 800 games broadcast on 
television, and over 3.1 million people tuning in for the National Championship game in 20151, 
Division I college basketball attracts more fans and viewers than any other women’s 
intercollegiate sport2.  The hiring of a head coach in women’s basketball is an important 
decision for athletic directors.  In addition to carrying the highest coaching salary and total team 
budget of any women’s sport3, a successful and entrepreneurially-minded coach can increase 
attendance, publicity, and corporate and donor support for the institution4, 5.  In turn, the 
commercial value of a women's basketball program could increase2.  The 38-year tenure of Hall 
of Fame coach Pat Summitt at the University of Tennessee that produced 1,098 wins and eight 
national championships is a testament to the institutional brand building that can occur through 
women’s basketball.  
Coaching turnover is a regular occurrence across the landscape of Division I college 
athletics.  In fact, there were 22 coaching changes in Division I women’s basketball in 2015, 
and 11.5 coaching vacancies per year for the 16 conferences under examination in this study in 
the first decade of the 2000s6.  The stakes are high for athletic directors making hiring and firing 
decisions because the decision can impact team success, reputation, attendance, and fundraising.  
As a result, the question of who to hire as the next coach captivates the minds of athletic 
directors, boosters, fans, media, and scholars.  The purpose of this study was to examine what 
latent factor profiles best predict change in win differential for Division I women’s basketball 
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coaches, and ultimately answer the question of what factors should athletic directors consider 
when hiring head coaching staff to ensure successful women's basketball programs. 
The impact of coaching succession on team performance has been extensively studied in 
the strategic leadership and sport management literature7-9.  Researchers have explored a variety 
of sport settings including European football, American football, professional baseball, hockey, 
and American intercollegiate sports to determine the impact of coaching succession on team 
performance.  These studies have sought to determine whether or not team performance is 
impacted as a result of hiring a new coach, and whether an athletic director or general manager 
should make a coaching change to improve team performance.  Findings have resulted in the 
development of three primary theoretical frameworks to explain the competing impacts of 
succession on team performance9.  Some scholars have found support for common sense theory, 
which posits that new coaches positively impact team performance10. Other research supports 
vicious-circle theory, which suggests that new coaches negatively impact team performance11.  
The final framework is ritual scapegoating theory, which argues that new coaches do not make 
any impact on team performance12.  
Common sense theory posits that improved performance should be expected when a new 
coach is hired to lead an already poor-performing team11.  Team performance is believed to 
improve based upon the positive psychological and motivational effect on players, provided by 
the turnover in leadership13, 14.  Improved performance has been particularly evident over the 
short-term, especially in mid-season coaching changes, but the impact tends to dissipate in the 
long-term15.  Allen, Panian, and Lotz10 offered compelling support for common sense theory, 
finding that between-season coaching changes in Major League Baseball had a more positive 
effect on team performance than changes that occurred within the season.  More recently, 
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White, Persad, and Gee16 found that mid-season changes in the National Hockey League 
resulted in improved performance even when the new coaches were less experienced than the 
coach who was fired.  
In contrast to common sense theory, vicious-circle theory posits that new coaches 
worsen performance because the circumstances surrounding hiring a new coach disrupt team 
routines and bring instability, tension, and low employee morale11, 17.  As a result, team 
performance fails to improve, and the succession process starts anew.  Fizel and D’Itri18 
examined the performance of men’s college basketball teams over an eight-year period and 
found that team performance typically declined.  Other studies exploring the National Hockey 
League and English soccer have demonstrated that managerial succession has a negative impact 
on team performance19, 20.  Soebbing and Washington17provided evidence that team 
performance following a coaching change in NCAA college football decreases in the short term 
before the coach is able to impact performance in a positive manner.  The inclusion of time is 
important for studies examining performance in college sports due to the ability to recruit new 
talent and retain them for up to four years.  Andersen7 concluded his review of the literature by 
stating, “a new manager does not make a better team” (p. 167).  
While some evidence has been found to support common sense and vicious-circle 
theories, there is other empirical evidence to suggest that coaching changes have no (or very 
little) effect on team performance because coaches are constrained by player talent, labor 
agreements, and player personnel decisions12, 9.  This phenomenon has been termed ritual 
scapegoat theory and implies that success or failure of the team is incorrectly attributed to the 
coach21.  When the team loses, management can appease upset stakeholders by making the fired 
coach the ritual scapegoat12.  Brown22 examined professional football in the 1970s and found 
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that changing coaches between seasons did not impact team performance for NFL teams.  
Similarly, Cannella and Rowe23 examined 30 years of between-season managerial changes in 
Major League Baseball and found that changing managers had no direct impact on team 
performance.  However, the context of college sports is different in light of the important role 
that coaches play in acquiring talent through recruiting student-athletes24.  
While these theories offer a framework for understanding the relationship between 
succession and team performance, they fail to explain what characteristics predict which 
coaches will be successful in their new position.  Put differently, the bulk of academic 
scholarship on coaching succession has focused on whether or not it is advisable to replace a 
coach, but it does not answer the question of what characteristics an athletic director should 
value when hiring a new coach.  Previous research has focused mostly on the question of should 
I fire, as opposed to whom do I hire.  As a result, some researchers saw an opportunity to shift 
their focus to address how coaching ability and experience could impact team performance 
following a coaching change23.  As Pfeffer and Blake25 noted, merely knowing that succession 
has occurred is not an adequate basis for predicting its consequences. Scholars working from 
this framework have been more focused on the characteristics that predict successful new 
coaches compared to the previously discussed research that has attempted to determine whether 
there is a benefit to firing a coach.  Once the decision is made to make a coaching change, 
athletic directors and general managers are more concerned with data that can lead to hiring the 
best coach in the applicant pool.  In many cases these administrative decision-makers have no 
choice but to hire a new coach in instances where the coach retires, takes a new position, or 
performs so poorly that the pressure to replace the coach becomes insurmountable21.   
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The research that has addressed the whom should I hire question has focused on the 
ability, experience, and previous position held by the newly hired coach.  Born from social 
learning theory26, 27, the concept that more experience helps to build skills is one that is widely 
used when assessing potential job candidates, or when determining one's career path28.  It is 
assumed that as one gains experience, they learn what to do (or not to do) in specific contexts.  
In coaching, for example, coaches may learn what leadership styles work with specific types of 
players, or what level of resources are needed to meet a particular threshold of success.  
Similarly, the more coaching experience one has, the more they could be influenced by role 
models or mentors that help to shape their professional philosophy29, 30.  Through these social 
interactions and differing learning experiences, coaches would enhance their coaching practice, 
which would be reflected in their win-loss records.     
Using these concepts from social learning theory, Pfeffer and Blake25 pioneered the 
whom should I hire coaching research when they examined the effect of successors’ abilities in 
the National Basketball Association.  Pfeffer and Blake defined ability by the prior cumulative 
win-loss percentage of the coach, a dummy variable for whether or not they had previously 
coached professional basketball, and the change in performance generated by the coach in 
previous positions.  When not taking into account the ability of the coach, the authors did not 
find a significant effect for succession, which supported ritual scapegoating theory.  However, 
when taking into account the coach’s ability, the authors found a significant effect. Coaches 
with better prior win-loss records, coaches with previous experience, and coaches who had 
improved the performance of other teams were associated with better team performance after 
the coaching change.  
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In a similar study, Canella and Rowe23 examined the effect of ability and experience on 
the results of succession in Major League Baseball.  Similar to Pfeffer and Blake21, Canella and 
Rowe found that managerial succession did not have any effect on team performance, 
supporting ritual scapegoating theory23.  However, the authors found that teams with managers 
of higher ability (i.e. high prior winning percentage as a manager) performed better than 
managers with lesser ability, but that experience (i.e. whether or not they had managed in the 
past) did not make a difference.  
Whether to hire an internal or external successor has also been examined31. Adding to 
this stream of literature, Ehrhardt, McEvoy, and Beggs32 addressed the question of whether it is 
better to hire from within the previous coaching staff (i.e. inside successor) or hire from outside 
the previous coaching staff (i.e. outside successor).  Ehrhardt, McEvoy and Beggs found that 
outside successors, who were head coaches or assistant coaches at another institution, 
performed significantly better than inside successors during the four years after a coaching 
change.  Bosch33 also examined the role of inside/outside succession, as well as tenure, job level 
experience, and leader effectiveness on team performance in Division I men’s college 
basketball.  Bosch found that having experience as a head coach at a power conference school 
was the only significant predictor of an increase in winning percentage.  In light of the research 
that has shown the ability, experience, and certain characteristics of coaches’ impact on team 
performance after coaching changes, the following hypothesis was developed: 
H1: Ability, experience, and characteristics of coaches will predict team performance 
following a coaching change. 
While succession studies have examined variables such as ability, experience, and 
previous coaching position, they have been limited in their scope of variables that could predict 
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coaching success.  Additionally, none of the coaching succession studies has focused on high-
level women's sport, suggesting a gender gap in the literature.  This study builds on the few 
coaching succession studies that do address who to hire by examining a much more 
comprehensive set of team, demographic, and institutional factors that are added to coaching 
experience and ability [23 total factors].   
Method 
Data and Sample 
 This study examined 185 coaching changes in Division I women’s basketball in 16 
conferences between 2000 and 2009.  The conferences included in the study were the Atlantic 
Coast, Atlantic 10, Big 12, Big East, Big Ten, Colonial Athletic Association, Conference USA, 
Horizon, Ivy League, Mid-American, Missouri Valley, Mountain West, Pacific 12, Patriot, 
Southeastern, and West Coast.  This time frame was chosen based upon the availability of data 
that could be collected from athletic department websites.  The year 2009 was the final year of 
data collection because researchers collected four years of coaching performance data after the 
coaching change.  The 16 conferences chosen were conferences that had competed in the largest 
number of NCAA tournament games during that time frame.  Data were collected exclusively 
from online sources including athletic department websites, team media guides, media articles, 
the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act database, and annual athletic department performance 
rankings on the website for the National Association for Collegiate Directors of Athletics.  Data 
collection included all coaching changes across the time period, meaning every coaching change 
that occurred between 2000 and 2009 was included as an individual case, even if multiple 
changes happened at one institution.  
Variables 
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Six categories were examined relative to the increase in number of wins following a 
coaching change.  Three of these categories are specific to the new coach: 1) the coach’s 
experience (which includes the level of the coach’s previous job, years’ experience as a coach, 
years’ experience as a head coach, and level of experience as a competitor in basketball); 2) 
coach’s previous performance categorized as: a) no head coach experience, b) coaches with 
previous head coach winning percentage higher than .634, and c) previous head coach 
percentage less than .634); and 3) the coach’s demographic characteristics (age, education level, 
race, gender.)  Three additional categories were examined that pertained to the program, which 
are: 4) hiring factors (if the coach came from a different level, internal vs. external hire, if the 
coach was an interim at the same program, and if the coach was from within the same 
conference); 5) characteristics of the institution (public vs. private, demographic market area, 
university enrollment, team budget, and NACDA standings); and 6) the previous success of the 
program (previous coach’s winning percentage, number of WNBA draft picks, and previous 
coach’s tenure).  The variables and definitions are summarized in Table 1. 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 The measures of team performance after the coaching change can be operationalized in 
several ways.  The common way to define performance is winning percentage, so one 
dependent variable could be the average winning percentage for three seasons following the 
coaching change.  A more parsimonious way to interpret the impact of the independent 
variables is to examine total net win differential (wins minus losses) for the three seasons 
following the change.  For this study the primary method for identifying success is the net 
change in win differential from the three years prior to the coaching change to the three years 
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after the change.  Total improvement in win differential was chosen as the primary variable over 
winning percentage due to the scale and interpretability of the results. 
Data analysis   
Each change was examined by category to determine which variables impact 
performance after a coaching change (SPSS, version 22).  Mixed models was performed to 
employ restricted maximum likelihood algorithms to account for asymptotic models and to 
allow the integration of nominal and scale variables into the same model34.  The next step would 
typically be to develop a general linear model that includes all items.  However, based on the 
small number of coaching changes sampled, analysis using mixed models has limitations.  The 
number of categorical variables and categories within each yields over 700 possible 
combinations, which is many times more than the number of cases in the sample.  Therefore, it 
was necessary to reduce the number of variables prior to conducting further analysis.  This 
study used Latent Class Analysis to reduce the data to one item per factor (similar to factor 
analysis with continuous data) due to the presence of both continuous and categorical data35. 
 Latent Class Analysis allows for the analysis of data with a large number of variables 
with a smaller sample size, and the resulting groups mirror common practice when describing a 
group of items.  For example, when describing groups, it is common to use more general 
descriptors, such as describing an institution as a public university with a large budget or 
describing a head-coach candidate as young and inexperienced.  Thus, Latent Class Analysis 
(LCA) is a statistical procedure that is used to classify individuals into homogeneous 
subgroups35.  In contrast to correlational analysis used in exploratory factor analysis, LCA 
identifies relationships through examination of conditional probabilities of certain response 
profiles to the factor items.  Individual class membership is assigned based on the strength of 
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probability that the class exists (latent class prevalence) and the strength of probability the class 
exhibits a predictable response profile35, 36. 
 Three categories of data were reduced using M-Plus36 following LCA procedures 
defined by Geiser35 (see below for further description).  Using these class assignments for each 
case along with the single variable measuring previous coaching success, mixed model analysis 
was performed to identify which categories have a relationship with changes in the number of 
wins following a coaching change. 
Results 
The first step prior to data analysis was to identify any outliers.  Two cases were 
removed: one case was removed for an excessive negative value on the dependent variable, and 
a second case was removed due to excessive influence on the results during step one.  The mean 
of the dependent variable, total number of wins less total number of losses for the three years 
following the coaching change, was -.890, so just short of one-third of a game each year.  The 
descriptive results for all variables are included in the ‘Total Sample’ column of Table 2. 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
The first phase of analysis was to examine which categories were related to an increase 
of wins following a coaching change.  This phase of analysis was done by examining the 
relationship of items within each a priori category to the net change in win differential for the 
three years prior to and three years following a coaching change.  Table 3 includes regression 
results for each category.  Interpretation of these results should only be done within categories.   
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 Examining the results in Table 3, there are only four variables that are significantly 
related to the change in wins following a coaching change.  The only candidate-related variable 
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that was significant was years of experience.  The coefficient for years of experience is 0.866, 
meaning that one year of experience was related to almost one more win over a three-year 
period.  The only significant variable for the institution, team budget/expense, has a coefficient 
of -0.0000398.  The interpretation is that for schools that have a dollar more in team expense, 
the number of wins is less by a small amount.  However, if the measure was converted to one 
million dollars, then there are 3.98 fewer wins following a coaching change.  Two variables 
measuring the past success of the program were significant.  The average wins per season of the 
previous coach were significant, with a coefficient of -3.012.  Interpreted simply, the more wins 
by the previous coach, the higher chance that wins will decrease following a coaching change.  
Additionally, programs with more success in having players drafted are more likely to increase 
wins following a coaching change (B = 2.054). 
 As stated above, an analysis with all the items could be conducted next, however the 
generally low number of cases prevents accurate calculation of such a large model38.  For all of 
the variables in this analysis, there would be over 700 different class group possibilities, but 
only 182 usable cases in the data set.  In order to examine the impact of each of these categories, 
the number of variables needs to be reduced.   
 Data reduction with continuous and discrete, Likert-type scales is common using 
procedures such as factor analysis.  However, categorizing data with nominal or dichotomous 
data is more complicated.  For this study, the procedures of Latent Class Analysis were 
employed (see 35 for further discussion).  Where data reduction with exploratory factor analysis 
is designed to determine the categories of variables, LCA is designed to determine the number 
of classes within each category.  The variables within this analysis are already categorized due 
to their descriptive nature (i.e. demographic variables, experience variables, etc.).  Therefore, 
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exploratory LCA was used to empirically determine the best number of classes within each 
category.  Analysis of each category was conducted with multiple class numbers (e.g. analysis 
with 3 classes, then 4, etc).  The most appropriate number of classes was determined by 
examining the Pearson’s chi-square values and likelihood ratios of each class number.  Further 
comparisons of models were done using bootstrapping comparisons of the likelihood ratios and 
the AIC, BIC and adjusted BIC of each model.  The results indicate that coach’s demographic 
and coach’s experience categories both have three classes.  Hiring factors, institution 
characteristics, and program’s previous success factors all have four classes.   
 Once the number of classes was determined, a final LCA was conducted within each 
category to generate predicted class membership for each case.  This membership value can 
then be used for further analysis to determine if the membership group demonstrates any 
significant variance in the dependent variable.  The result of the LCA and corresponding 
descriptions can be found in Table 2.   
The classes of demographic groups of new women's head coaches can be described as: 
1) young (mean age=36), primarily female (80.6%); 2) white (97.1%), mid-aged (mean = 49) 
mixed gender (F = 52.9); and 3) older males (mean = 67).  The experience classes can be 
described as: 1) no-head coach experience (100% of class); 2) head coaches with lower level of 
experience (100% head coach, mean years head coach experience = 5.38); and 3) head coaches 
with the highest level of experience (mean years head coach experience = 13.9).  The hiring 
factor broke into very clear classes: 1) external from the same level (100%); 2) external from 
one level up (i.e. Power 5 conference to “mid-major”) (100%); 3) external from one level down 
(i.e. mid-major to Power 5 conference) (100%); and 4) internal (conference affiliation was not 
important to class membership) (interim = 32%, internal not interim = 68%).   
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Institution characteristics were divided primarily by funding (private vs. public), and by 
team expenses: 1) private schools with small to moderate budgets (private = 100%, mean 
expense = $1,038K); 2) public schools with the smallest budget (public = 100%, mean expense 
= $911K); 3) public schools with moderate budgets (public = 100%, mean expense = $1,124K); 
and 4) large primarily public schools with the largest budgets (public = 83.1%, mean expense = 
$2,092K).   
Previous program success classes can be described as: 1) programs with moderate 
success (previous win% = .617) and average of draft picks (picks = 2.37); 2) low success 
(previous win% = .369) and very few draft picks (mean picks = .80); 3) over a decade with 
previous coach (mean tenure = 13yrs), largest number of draft picks (mean picks = 12.5); and 4) 
longest tenure of previous coach (mean tenure = 19.5yrs), moderate draft picks (mean picks = 
3.42). 
 These classes were then used in a mixed models analysis of the overall change in wins 
from three years prior, to three years after, the coaching change.  The results of this analysis can 
be seen in Table 4.  The only significant category that related to change in wins was previous 
success of the program.  Programs of moderate to moderately high success tended to have the 
largest decrease in wins following a coaching change.  The only class that indicated a positive 
change in wins was the programs of lowest previous success.  It is important to note that the 
changes are minimal.  For example, the programs of lowest success had an increase of 4.2 
games over 3 years.  The change of little more than one game a year is not generally seen as a 
great impact on perceptions of team performance. For example, accounting for and holding 
constant all items in the model, a team with 8 wins and 22 losses (near the mean winning 
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percentage of this class; .363) would only expect to improve to 9 wins and 21 losses (winning 
percentage of .429).   
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 The results of the linear mixed models analysis differ from the initial results in Table 3.  
The only variable attributable to the coach that has significant relationship to a change in wins 
following a coaching change is years of experience. However, this lone significant result in the 
within-category analysis was not strong enough to create significance for the between-factor 
class analysis when controlling for past team performance.  Similarly, team expense was not 
strong enough to create significance for the institution category in the mixed models analysis.  
Discussion 
Despite much of the existing literature indicating that coaches are scapegoats for losing 
and that coaching changes do not translate to more wins7, 20-22, intercollegiate athletic coaches 
are routinely replaced for low performance.  Pressure from students, fans, alumni, and a variety 
of other stakeholders often leave an athletic director with little choice but to replace a coach, 
especially in instances where winning is at a premium.  In the wake of these changes, athletic 
directors and hiring committees must evaluate a variety of factors to hire a coach that can 
achieve the desired level of success.  While winning at the elite level of college sports is the 
primary evaluative factor often used in firing decisions9, 21, 39, winning as a dependent variable 
in academic research has only been examined in relation to a few isolated independent 
variables.  This study broadened those factors and examined a total of 23 independent variables 
within six categories to determine which variables are most likely to predict success.   
Results of the regressions for each category revealed that coaching experience positively 
predicted team performance after the coaching change.  However, the result indicated that three 
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years after a coaching change, only one more win would be expected from hiring an 
experienced coach versus an inexperienced coach.  Although one win could make a difference 
for tournament implications or other scenarios, it is doubtful that an athletic director or other 
stakeholders would be happy with an increase of one win over the course of three years.  So, 
pragmatically, hiring a coach with more experience is statistically significant, but may not be as 
impactful as hoped by stakeholders, at least in terms of winning.  Beyond this, after controlling 
for institutional factors and past team performance in the mixed models analysis, none of the 
characteristics of the coach aided in the ability to predict performance.  Thus, the hypothesis 
was rejected.   
The only significant predictor of win differential when considering the six categories 
was the past performance of the team, as measured by winning percentage of the previous head 
coach.  Teams generally regressed towards the mean in a statistically but not practically 
significant manner.  While other studies have found that characteristics such as ability and 
experience of the coach significantly predict performance after a coaching change, no study to 
date has included the breadth of variables included in this study.  The results primarily support 
ritual scapegoat theory in light of the pragmatically insignificant impact that coaching changes 
made on team performance and the insignificant role played by the characteristics of the 
coaches. Although there are isolated examples of coaching changes making dramatic 
differences in a program, those cases are not normal.  Betting on such a dramatic change in 
women's Division I basketball, especially considering the findings of this study, is a gamble on 
the part of athletic directors and other stakeholders.  
 Coaching characteristics examined in this study have very little relationship to an 
increase in winning, which supports ritual scapegoating.  Whether it is demographics, level of 
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experience (college, professional, etc.), previous winning percentage, or origin of their hire 
(lower tier, internal, conference affiliation, etc.), women’s Division I coaches have 
approximately the same success - assuming they step into similar contexts.  Even though the 
factors that are most related to changes in wins are not related to the coach, there are 
environmental conditions to consider.  Specifically, the landscape of the program making the 
change (i.e., program's previous success) was the only latent class significantly related to a 
change in wins.   
 Context was important in that both high and low performers moved toward the mean.  
Coaches who replaced previously successful coaches tended to do worse than their 
predecessors, which supports vicious circle theory.  Coaches replacing a program with limited 
success showed an increase in wins, supporting common sense theory.  These results were 
intuitive and follow previous research10, 16 that indicates that changes in coaching tend to move 
struggling programs toward the overall mean.  However, it is once again important to 
distinguish between statistically significant and pragmatic findings.  For example, the programs 
of lowest previous success had an increase of 4.2 games over three years.  The change of little 
more than one game a year is not generally seen as a large improvement on team performance. 
For example, accounting for and holding constant all items in the model, a team with 10 wins 
and 20 losses would only expect to improve to 11 wins and 19 losses the following season.   
Limitations and future recommendations 
There are some limitations that suggest caution when interpreting the results.  First, 
although this study examined more variables than other coaching succession studies, there are 
still many variables that were not investigated.  For example, the individual personalities of the 
coach, as well as the relative fit between coach and institution, could provide more specific 
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perspectives on program success.  Recruiting and player talent assessments, particularly during 
the time of coaching transition, could also provide another layer of analysis.  Future research 
could expand coaching succession inquiry by increasing the number and types of variables 
examined.  The inclusion of political skill in coaching research, for example, may help to better 
clarify the relationship between social effectiveness characteristics and coaching success. 
Relationships are unavoidable aspects of life and coaching, and success in both realms comes in 
part from an ability to engage in meaningful and productive social interactions. In short, success 
in life and coaching is likely to be linked to social effectiveness. Hence, politically skilled 
coaches may be better recruiters, coaches, and talent managers because they “understand other 
individuals and situations, sense what is expected of them, manage shared meaning, and 
influence others in ways that help them better achieve recruitment goals”40, p. 1293. Indeed, 
several studies40, 41 have explicitly shown how politically skilled coaches were better able to 
land desired recruits than less politically skilled coaches. So, in future studies looking at 
coaching, recruiting, and performance success, the social effectiveness characteristics of 
coaches, such as their levels of political skill, appear to be an area ripe for further exploration. 
Second, this quantitative study is meant to generalize results across all coaching changes.  There 
are certainly coaching successions that do not fall in line with the trends found in this study.  
Isolating these outliers was not part of the analysis.  Finally, the analyses in this study are 
limited by confounding factors.  For example, large institutions with big budgets tend to hire the 
most successful and experienced coaches and thus there are many factors that are included in 
the net change in wins.  There is extreme difficulty in isolating the effects of one variable, even 
using large models with multiple factors and items.  Some of the confounding effects are lost in 
the LCA process.  Future research in this area should include a class analysis perspective along 
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with multi-variable correlational analysis, such as structural equation modeling with class 
analysis given a larger sample size.   
Finally, the study could also be replicated and expanded by investigating other sport 
contexts (e.g., men's basketball, football, Olympic sports), as well as different NCAA divisions.   
These differing contexts may demonstrate findings inconsistent with women's Division I 
basketball.  Additionally, incorporating qualitative or mixed methods designs to better 
understand the specific programs and coaching changes from institution to institution would 
shed light on the unique contexts associated with coaching changes.  Utilizing a case study 
approach would allow for the isolation of critical factors in high and low performing contexts.   
Conclusion 
 In the competitive environment of NCAA Division I sports, it is clear that pressures to 
change leadership often occur.  The results of the current study largely support ritual 
scapegoating theory as an explanation for coaching changes within NCAA Women's Division I 
basketball.  Essentially, it can be reasoned that changing coaches does not produce enough of a 
practical difference to justify the time, energy, and potential impact on student-athletes to make 
the change worthwhile, especially if the change is mostly due to athletic performance.  When 
coaching changes do occur, it is clear that the most important variable to predict changes in 
winning is the program's previous success, and not the individual characteristics of the coach.  
However, changes in winning percentage are relatively small with the most impactful changes 
producing only one more or less win over the course of three years following the coaching 
change.   
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Table 1 
Grouping Factors and Individual Variables with Category Descriptions 
 
 
Factor and Items 
Descriptions  
Coach’s Demographic Classes           Demographic characteristics of the newly hired 
coach     Education level  Bachelor 
 Master 
    Minority status White 
 Minority 
    Gender Female 
 Male 
    Age (means) 
Coach’s Experience Classes          
    Playing experience College  Highest level of playing experience for the head 
coach  Professional 
 No Pro or College  
    Previous job 
  
Assistant Coach 
Head Coach 
Coach did not have head coaching experience 
Coach had head coaching experience   
    Years coaching (means) Years of coaching experience 
    Yrs head coach  (means) Years of head coaching experience 
Coach’s Ability   
     Previous Head 
Coach Win 
Categories 
None (Assist. Only) 
Higher win % 
Lower win % 
All coaches with no experience as head coach 
Coaches with higher than .634 win % as HC 
Coaches with lower than .634 win % as HC 
Hiring Factors                    
    Level hired from One level down 
Same level 
One level up 
Previous school was at lesser competitive level  
Previous school was at same competitive level     
Previous school was at higher competitive level 
    Origin of the coach Interim 
Internal, not interim 
External 
Coach hired after being interim coach 
Coach hired from the prior coaching staff     
Coach hired from outside the university 
    Conference 
affiliation 
Yes 
No 
Did the coach have experience coaching 
previously in the same conference? 
Institution Characteristics              
    Funding source Private  
Public 
Private or public school 
    Market DMA (means) Demographic market area rank based on 
geocommons.com 
    Team expense  (means) Team budget from Equity in Athletics 
Disclosure report 
    NACDA rank (means) NACDA directors cup ranking 
    Enrollment (means) Total institutional enrollment 
Program’s Previous Success            
    Coach’s tenure (means) Previous coach’s tenure (years) 
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    Coach’s wins (means) Previous coach’s wins per season 
    WNBA Picks  (means) Total number of WNBA draft picks 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics by Group Classes 
Factors, Items and groups  Means or Response Percentages 
(bold numbers represent group descriptors) 
 
 
Total 
Sample 
Group 1  Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Coach’s Demographic Classes         n=  182 134 34 14  
    Education level  Bachelor 
Master 
59.3 
40.7 
58.3 
41.7 
61.8 
28.2 
75.0 
25.0 
 
    Minority status 
 
White 
Minority 
77.5 
22.5 
72.9 
27.1 
97.1 
2.9 
75.0 
25.0 
 
    Gender 
 
Female 
Male 
27.5 
72.5 
80.6 
19.4 
52.9 
47.1 
0.0 
100 
 
    Age (means) 39.16 36.03 49.18 67.00  
Coach’s Experience Classes           n= 182 64 60 58  
    Playing 
experience 
 
College 
Professional 
No Pro or College 
74.7 
12.6 
12.6 
70.3 
17.2 
12.5 
81.7 
13.3 
5.0 
72.4 
6.9 
20.7 
 
    Previous job 
  
Assistant Coach 
Head Coach 
47.8 
52.2 
100 
0.0 
23.3 
76.7 
15.5 
84.5 
 
    Years coaching (means) 14.55 10.67 11.95 21.53  
    Yrs head coach  (means) 6.12 0.0 5.38 13.90  
Coach’s Ability  182     
     Previous Head 
Coach Win 
Categories 
None(Assist. Only) 
Higher win % 
Lower win % 
35.7 
31.9 
32.4 
100 
0 
0 
0 
100 
0 
0 
0 
100 
 
Hiring Factors                  n= 182 79 39 39 25 
    Level hired 
from 
One level down 
Same level 
One level up 
21.4 
57.1 
21.4 
0 
100 
0 
0 
0 
100 
100 
0 
0 
0 
100 
0 
    Origin of the 
coach 
Interim 
Internal, not interim 
External 
4.4 
9.3 
 
86.3 
0 
0 
 
100 
0 
0 
 
100 
0 
0 
 
100 
32 
68 
 
0 
    Conference 
affiliation 
Same conference 
Diff. conference 
27.5 
72.5 
22 
57 
4 
35 
9 
30 
25 
0 
Institution Characteristics            n= 182 61 45 17 59 
    Funding source Private  
Public 
63.2 
36.8 
100 
0 
0 
100 
0 
100 
16.9 
83.1 
    Market DMA (means) 49.63 30.39 59.09 48.76 62.54 
    Team expense  (means) $1356K $1,038K $911K $1,124K $2,092K 
    NACDA rank (means) 107.63 146.6 140.1 135.1 34.6 
    Enrollment (means) 16,265 6,948 16,273 17,102 25,649 
Program’s Previous Success          n= 182 52 89 17 24 
    Coach’s tenure (means) 8.24 6.46 5.34 13.00 19.50 
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    Coach’s wins (means) .496 .617 .369 .652 .587 
    WNBA Picks  (means) 2.69 2.37 0.80 12.53 3.42 
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Table 3 
 
Regression Results by Category 
 
Categories and Items  F Test Sig. 
Coach’s Demographic Characteristics (R2=.015)   
 Education level  0.018 .892 
 Minority status   0.412 .521 
 Gender  0.051 .821 
 Age  1.340 .249 
Coach’s Experience (R2=.044)    
 Coach’s previous playing experience  1.124 .327 
 Coach’s previous job  1.264 .262 
 Number of years coaching  4.681 .032** 
 Number of years as a head coach  1.012 .316 
Coach’s Ability (R2=.010)    
 Previous Wins Categorized  0.882 .416 
Hiring Factors (R2=.011)    
 Level coach hired from  0.405 .668 
 Origin of the coach  0.463 .630 
 Conference affiliation  0.157 .692 
Institution Characteristics  (R2=.117)    
 Funding sources/Public or private  1.439 .232 
 Market DMA  1.162 .283 
 Team expense budget  5.224 .023** 
 NACDA ranking  1.485 .225 
 Institution’s overall enrollment   0.172 .679 
Program’s Previous Success (R2=.221)    
 Previous coach’s tenure    0.265 .608 
 Previous coach’s wins per season  43.731 .000** 
 Number of WNBA Picks   14.161 .000** 
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Table 4 
Mixed Models Analysis 
Categories and Items Mean of DV F Test Sig. 
Coach’s Demographic Characteristics 1.077 .343 
Coach’s Experience  1.566 .212 
Coach’s Ability  .983 .370 
Hiring Factors  .793 .531 
Institution Characteristics   1.178 .298 
Program’s Previous Success  10.527 .000 
 Group 1 
 Group 2 
 Group 3 
 Group 4 
-16.31 
    4.19 
   -1.06 
   -9.41 
  
# - reference group, other group significance in related to group 1   
 
 
 
 
 
